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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-000OOO000-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BOYD LEE PREECE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970576-CA 
Priority No. 15 
-000OOO000-
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the provisions 
of Section 78-2a-3(e) of Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. STANDARD OF REVIEW, 
AND CITATION OF RECORD 
POINT I 
WHETHER TROOPER TROY DENNY'S STOP OF THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S 
VEHICLE WAS ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE TROOPER DENNY 
LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP DEFENDANT/APPELLANTS VEHICLE. 
The issue preserved by the Defendant/Appellant is whether the trial court 
committed error in finding that Trooper Troy Denny had probable cause to stop 
Defendant/Appellant's vehicle. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court has the primary responsibility for making determinations of fact, 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). A trial court's findings of fact in a 
criminal bench trial are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, State v. 
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 N.2 (Utah 1988). A trial court's finding is clearly 
erroneous when it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or, although there is 
evidence to support it, the court reviewing the record is left with a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made, Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36. 
CITATION OF RECORD 
Judgment and Sentence (1Rec. 87). 
POINT II 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT MADE AN UNSAFE LANE CHANGE. 
The issue preserved by the Defendant/Appellant is whether the trial court 
committed error in finding that the Defendant/Appellant made an unsafe lane change. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
See. Point I above. 
CITATION OF RECORD 
See Point I above. 
All references are of record; Rec. refers to record. 
2 
POINT III 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN CONCLUDING THAT 
§41-6-44(2)(i) DESCRIBES THE CONDITIONS IN SAID STATUTE AS A 
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION RATHER THAN PRESUMPTIVE. 
The issue preserved by the Defendant/Appellant is whether the trial court 
committed error in concluding that §41-6-44(2)(i) describes the conditions in said 
statute as a conclusive presumption rather than presumptive. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Standard of Review to review the trial court's determination of the law is a 
correctness standard, State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). An appellate 
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer any degree of the trial court's 
deference of law, State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
CITATION OF RECORD 
See Point I above. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES. AND REGULATIONS 
Section 41-6-44(2)(a)(i) and (ii) provide: 
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle within this state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater as shown by the chemical test given within two hours after 
the alleged operation or physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the 
person incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
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Section 41-6-69(1 )(a) Utah Code Annotated provides: 
A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a 
roadway or change lanes until the movement can be made with 
reasonable safety and an appropriate signal has been given. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case: 
Defendant/Appellant seeks a reversal of a Judgment and Sentence of conviction 
finding the Defendant/Appellant guilty of driving with .08 blood alcohol content and 
guilty of unsafe lane change. 
B. Course of Proceeding: 
Defendant/Appellant was arrested on March 10, 1997, for DUI and was 
subsequently charged with Operating or Being in Actual Physical Control of a Motor 
Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs; Driving with Breath/Blood 
Alcohol Concentration of .08 grams or Greater and/or Being in Actual Physical Control; 
Open Container of Alcohol in a Vehicle; and Unsafe Lane Change. A Motion to 
Suppress Hearing was held on May 21, 1997. Trial was held on August 8, 1997. 
Defendant/Appellant was sentenced and a Sentence, Judgment, Commitment was 
signed and entered on September 16, 1997. A Notice of Appeal was signed and 
entered on October 2, 1997. A Stipulation for Entry of Certificate of Probable Cause 
and to Amend Notice of Appeal was signed and entered on October 24, 1997. An 
Amended Notice of Appeal was signed and entered on October 24, 1997. An Order on 
Certificate of Probable Cause was signed and entered on November 10, 1997. 
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C. Disposition of the Court below: 
Judgment, Sentence, Commitment was signed and entered on September 16, 
1997. A Notice of Appeal was signed and entered on October 2, 1997. An Amended 
Notice of Appeal was signed and entered on October 24, 1997. A Certificate of 
Probable Cause was signed and entered on October 24, 1997. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about March 10, 1997, at 10:30 p.m., Trooper Troy Denny was westbound 
out of Richmond, Utah, on SR142 when he noticed a Ford truck with a camper shell 
driving at a slow rate of speed with its left/hand blinker on (1Rec. 32 & 33). 
Trooper Denny turned around and pulled behind the truck when it made a left hand turn 
signal onto Main Street in Lewiston (1Rec. 33). Trooper Denny followed the truck North 
on Main Street with a speed of about 25 mph (1Rec. 34). Trooper Denny closely 
followed the truck ( 3 - 4 car lengths) for approximately a quarter mile when the truck 
2pulled to the right of the road and back on without signaling to allow Trooper Denny's 
1
 All references are of record; Rec. refers to record. 
2On cross-examination, Trooper Denny testified at the time of the stop that Defendant/Appellant 
was not impeding traffic or causing any hazard and that Defendant/Appellant "slightly pulled" to the right 
side of the road (1Rec. 50). 
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vehicle to go 1by (2Rec. 34), at which time Trooper Denny made a traffic 3stop (2Rec. 
34, 50 & 51 )4. 
Once Trooper Denny stopped the Defendant/Appellant's truck, he approached 
the truck and smelled an odor of alcohol coming from Defendant/Appellant's truck. 
Trooper Denny also noticed a case of beer in Defendant/Appellant's truck and a beer 
can between the passenger and the driver (2Rec. 35). Trooper Denny asked the 
Defendant/Appellant if he had been drinking and the Defendant/Appellant responded, 
"Yes." Trooper Denny then testified that he asked the Defendant/Appellant to perform 
the field sobriety tests (2Rec. 35 & 36). The Defendant/Appellant was asked and 
performed the horizontal eye gaze nystagmus test, the one-legged stand, and the walk 
and turn 5test (2Rec. 36). Upon the conclusion of the test, Trooper Denny reached an 
opinion that the Defendant/Appellant was unsafe to drive or operate a motor vehicle 
Defendant/Appellant testified he was looking at properties, or land for sale, and as he turned 
towards Richmond, the [Trooper Denny's vehicle] approached him from behind and came extremely close 
(2Rec. 64). Defendant/Appellant then testified he pulled over a little bit to the highway edge to allow 
[Trooper Denny's] vehicle to go by (2Rec.64). 
2AII references are of record; Rec. refers to record. 
3Defendant/Appellant's witness, Todd Preece, testified that he was an occupant in 
Defendant/Appellant's vehicle and that Defendant/Appellant pulled over a little bit to let the officer go by 
(2Rec. 58), and does not recall Defendant/Appellant pulling off the side of the road and coming back on 
(2Rec. 60-61). 
4At the Suppression Hearing held on May 21,1997, Trooper Denny testified that he did not cite the 
Defendant/Appellant for any traffic violations (2Rec. 15). Trooper Denny was suspicious of the 
Defendant/Appellant's pattern of activity, whether he was showing signs of impairment or that he was a 
farmer living in the vicinity and was looking at his fields (2Rec. 15,16 & 18). 
5Defendant/Appellant testified that he had problems taking these tests because he was overweight 
and had an inner-ear infection which affected his balance. Defendant/Appellant also testified the Trooper 
Denny had him take off his glasses and wasn't able to see very well without his bifocals (2Rec. 67). 
Defendant/Appellant also testified the surface of the roadway was gravelly with some loose pebbles or 
rocks which affected his [balance] (2Rec. 68). 
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(1Rec. 38) whereupon Trooper Denny placed the Defendant/Appellant in handcuffs and 
took him to where Defendant/Appellant gave a breath sample (1Rec. 38). The 
intoxilizer printout established Defendant/Appellant had a breath alcohol of .101 
(1Rec. 49; Plaintiffs Exhibit 4). 
Trooper Denny testified that an hour and a half had elapsed at the time 
Defendant/Appellant was arrested and the by the time the Defendant/Appellant took the 
intoxilizer test (1Rec. 77). 
Trooper Denny testified that at the time of the arrest Defendant/Appellant's 
blood alcohol could have been a .09 or .085 (1Rec. 77). Trooper Denny further testified 
that he was familiar with the Widmark Formula, and that the formula determines the 
alcohol rate of consumption and the metabolic rate is .15 per hour (1Rec. 77). Trooper 
Denny then testified that if you times that by \-V* [hours], that would put it at 2-% 
(1Rec. 77 and 78). Trooper Denny was then asked if this would put the 
Defendant/Appellant under the legal limit of .08 (1Rec. 78). At that time, Mr. Draper, the 
Cache County Prosecutor, objected on the basis of irrelevance and the following 
colloquy took place between defense counsel, prosecutor and the court (1Rec. 78): 
MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, I think I'm going to object to this line of questioning based 
on relevance. The statutes are very clear that, that if the test is given within two hours 
there's, there's, it's pretty well conclusive of what the test was at the time of driving. 
THE JUDGE: It's a conclusive presumption under the statute. 
1
 All references are of record; Rec. refers to record. 
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MR. SKABELUND: That's right? 
THE JUDGE: So I'll sustain the objection," (1Rec. 78). 
At conclusion of Trial, the court made its findings that the incident occurred 
March 10, 1997, in the Richmond/Lewiston area in Cache County, State of Utah, that 
the officer was traveling westbound and observed a vehicle of slowness at 10:00 p.m. 
traveling at a slow rate of speed in an open area of the county that was uninhabited. 
The officer turned around and followed the vehicle (1Rec. 86). The 
Defendant/Appellant pulled off to the right side of the road without signaling (1Rec. 87). 
The Defendant/Appellant smelled of alcohol and went through the field sobriety testing. 
The court recognized that the Defendant/Appellant had an inner-ear infection that could 
effect his balance. The court then found that the officer had probable cause to stop the 
Defendant/Appellant and that because of the odor of alcohol and when the tests were 
performed, the officer had sufficient belief to place the Defendant/Appellant under 
arrest. Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 showed that there was .101 blood alcohol level which is 
higher than the legal limit which is .08, and as a result the court found the 
Defendant/Appellant not guilty of the DUI and guilty of the .08 blood alcohol content. 
The court also found the Defendant/Appellant guilty of Open Container in a Motor 
Vehicle and guilty of an Unsafe Lane Change (1Rec. 88-89). 
Ali references are of record; Rec. refers to record. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court committed error in finding that Trooper Troy Denny had probable 
cause to stop Defendant/Appellant's vehicle in that Trooper Denny lacked any 
reasonable articulable suspicion that Defendant/Appellant was committing a traffic 
violation as set forth in the standards of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
973, 20 L.Ed 2.d 889 (1968) and State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). 
II. The trial court committed error in finding Defendant/Appellant made an unsafe 
lane change given that the Information filed with the action did not require a signal. 
The clear weight of the evidence established that the Defendant/Appellant did make 
movement upon the highway and that such movement was made with reasonable 
safety. 
III. The trial court committed error in concluding that §41-6-44(2)(a)(i) describes the 
conditions in said statute as a conclusive presumption rather than presumptive. Both 
§41-6-44(2) and §41-6-44.3(3) and both Crandall and Walker cases clearly establish 
that the Utah State Legislature did not intend §41-6-44(2) to be a conclusive 
presumption. 
ARGUMENT 
(Point I) 
TROOPER DENNY LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANTS VEHICLE IN THAT THE TROOPER LACKED ANY 
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
WAS COMMITTING A TRAFFIC VIOLATION. 
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It was error for the trial court to find in the Trial that Trooper Denny had probable 
cause to stop the Defendant/Appellant's vehicle given that Trooper Denny had no 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the Defendant/Appellant had committed, or was 
about to commit, a traffic violation. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees "the right 
of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures," U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The United States 
Supreme Court has held that "stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants 
constitutes a seizure," within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, "even though the 
purpose of the stop is limited to resulting detention quite brief," Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed 2.d 660 (1979). "Thus, although a 
person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in his own home, one does not 
lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile," State v. 
Scholosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (Citations omitted). 
However, "what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but 
unreasonable searches and seizures," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 973, 
20 L.Ed. 2.d 889 (1968), quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 
1437, 1446-47, 4 L.Ed. 2.d 1669 (1960). To determine whether a search or seizure is 
constituted as reasonable, we must make a dual inquiry: (1) was the officer's action 
justified in its inception, and (2) was the resulting detention reasonably related to the 
scope of the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. A 
10 
constitutionally justified stopping of a vehicle is sufficient when "an observed traffic 
violation gives the officer 'at least a probable cause to believe the citizen has 
committed a traffic offense/" State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 882 note #2 (Utah App. 
1989). See also United States v. Cummings, 920 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Circuit 1990) 
holding that "when an officer observes a traffic offense, however minor, he has 
probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle," State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123 
(Utah 1983). 
An observed violation, however, is not required. "Stopping a vehicle may be 
also justified when the officer has reasonable articulate suspicion that the driver is 
committing a traffic offense such as driving under the influence of alcohol or driving 
without a license . . . [or that] the driver is engaged in more serious criminal activity 
such as transporting drugs," State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah Cir. App. 
1992). In other words of the United States Supreme Court, as long as an officer 
suspects that "a driver is violating any one of the multiple applicable traffic or 
equipment regulations, the police officer may legally stop the vehicle," Prouse, 440 
U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400, quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). 
In this particular circumstance, Trooper Denny, on March 10, 1997, noticed 
Defendant/Appellant's truck driving at a slower rate of speed with a left/hand blinker on 
(1Rec. 32-33). Trooper Denny turned around and followed the Defendant/Appellant's 
truck. According to Trooper Denny's own testimony, he was 3-4 car lengths behind 
1
 All references are of record; Rec. refers to record. 
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Defendant/Appellant's vehicle for approximately a quarter of a mile when the 
Defendant/Appellant's vehicle pulled "slightly" to the right side of the road and back 
without signaling (1Rec. 34). Trooper Denny also testified that Defendant/Appellant 
was not impeding traffic or causing any hazard (1Rec. 50). Trooper Denny, at the 
Suppression Hearing, had previously testified that he did not cite the 
Defendant/Appellant for any traffic violations fRec. 15), and that Trooper Denny was 
suspicious of the Defendant/Appellant's pattern of activities, whether he was showing 
signs of impairment or that he was a farmer living in the vicinity looking at the fields 
(1Rec. 15, 16 & 18). 
To possess and articulable suspicion of illegal activity sufficient to justify 
stopping of the vehicle, a police officer must have articulable reason to objectively 
believe that the law has been violated, either by someone in the vehicle or by the 
vehicle itself. The general rule is that for the stop to be legal, the operation of the 
vehicle must appear to be more consistent with illegal than with lawful activity. See 
People v. Loucks, 135 III. App. 3.d 530, 481 N.E. 2.d 1086 (1985) and State v. 
Cavanaugh, 230 Neb. 889, 434 N.W. 2.d 36 (1989). Here, the articulable suspicion 
should be found lacking in view of the circumstances and the stop not justified, 
particularly when the officer testified the Defendant/Appellant was not impeding traffic 
or causing any hazard, and when the officer himself questioned whether the 
Defendant/Appellant had signs of impairment or was a farmer living in the vicinity 
1
 All references are of Record; Rec. refers to record. 
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looking at his fields. Given the factors in this case, Trooper Denny lacked probable 
cause to stop Defendant/Appellant's vehicle. 
(Point II) 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT HAD MOVED RIGHT OR LEFT UPON A HIGHWAY OR 
CHANGED LANES WHEN SUCH MOVE COULD NOT BE MADE IN REASONABLE 
SAFETY. 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies what an Information 
must provide to the defendant: 
an . . . information shall charge the defendant of which the 
defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the 
offense by common law, or by statute, or by stating in concise 
terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give the 
defendant notice of the charge. Utah R.Crim. P.4(b). 
[W]hat the defendant is entitled to is an information which 
sufficiently informs him to enable him to understand the charge 
against him and to prepare a defense. 
Furthermore, an information may be: 
amended at any time before verdict if no additional or different 
offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defense are 
not prejudiced. Utah R.Crim. P.4(d). 
The Plaintiff/Appellee's Information filed in this action on Count 4 provides: 
CRIME: Unsafe Lane Change 
IN VIOLATION OF: Section 41-6-69(1 )(a) U.C.A. 1953, as amended 
CLASSIFICATION: Class C. Misdemeanor 
AT; Cache County, State of Utah 
ON OR ABOUT: March 10, 1997 
The acts of the Defendant constituting the public offense were: 
13 
That the said Defendant, on the day an dplace aforesaid, driver of 
a vehicle, did move right or left upon a roadway or change lanes, 
when such movement could not be made with reasonable safety 
(1Rec. 2-4). 
The language in §41-6-69 Utah Code Annotated provides additional language of 
". . . and an 'appropriate signal1 has been given." It states in full as follows: 
(1 )(a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left upon 
a highway or change lanes until the movement can be made 
with reasonable safety when an appropriate signal has been 
given. 
Defendant/Appellant relied upon the language as set forth in the Information as 
prepared by Plaintiff/Appellee. 
The evidence established by the court establishes that: (1) the 
Defendant/Appellant was not impeding traffic (2Rec. 50); (2) the Defendant/Appellant 
was not causing any hazard (2Rec. 50); (3) the Defendant/Appellant had pulled slightly 
to the right side of the road to allow the officer to pass (2Rec. 34, 50-60 & 61); (4) the 
Defendant/Appellant was driving at a slow rate of speed of about 25 mph (2Rec. 34); 
(5) Trooper Denny did not cite Defendant/Appellant for any traffic violation (2Rec. 15). 
The reading of the Information does not provide that the Defendant/Appellant be 
required to use signals (2Rec. 2-4). The court found the Defendant/Appellant guilty of 
Unsafe Lane Change stating that Defendant/Appellant had "moved the vehicle upon 
the right upon a highway without the signal which was viewed in the tape." The finding 
All references are of court record; Rec. refers to record. 
2AII references are of record; Rec. refers to record. 
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of the court was erroneous. The Information did not provide that a signal was required. 
It was reversible error for the court to find Defendant/Appellant guilty of an unsafe lane 
change when evidence was lacking that Defendant/Appellant made movement upon a 
highway without reasonable safety. 
(Point III) 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN CONCLUDING THAT 
§41-6-44(2)(i) DESCRIBES THE CONDITIONS IN SAID STATUTE AS A 
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION RATHER THAN PRESUMPTIVE. 
The issue preserved by the Defendant/Appellant is whether the trial court 
committed error in sustaining the State's objection that pursuant to §41-6-44(2)(a)(i) 
that a chemical test is given within two (2) hours and that it is a "conclusive 
presumption" that the Defendant/Appellant was driving while intoxicated. 
On direct examination of Trooper Denny, the following colloquy took place: 
"Defense Counsel: Officer Denney, just a couple questions I failed to ask before. You 
indicated that you had some background, training and experience in intoxicated 
persons. Is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And where did you get that training at? 
A. Through part of the training and qualification it takes to be hired with the 
Highway Patrol and experience after that that's on-the-job experience. 
Q. Okay. With that background and training did you study or become 
educated in how alcohol works upon a person? 
15 
A. I've got a knowledge of it. 
Q. Does that background and training also tell you how fast alcohol can be 
absorbed in the system? 
A It is taught. I don't remember exactly what it is. At one time it was told to 
me. 
Q. Okay. You indicated that the intoxilizer printout was at .10. Is that 
correct? 
A. 101. 
Q. 101? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Based upon your background and training do you have an idea of what 
type of alcohol, the blood alcohol would have been of Mr. Preece at the time of the 
arrest if an hour and a half, hour and a half would have lapsed since the time of the 
arrest until the time he took the intoxilizer test? 
A. I could do it with the numbers. At the time right now in my head I don't 
have an idea. It, it would be higher, possibly a 1, a 12. 
Q. Okay. That's if he, if he was coming down. Is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. What if he was going up? 
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A. At the time of the arrest if he was going up and given the circumstances, 
he gave a .101 at the time that he did, my guess would be that he would be about a .09, 
.085. 
Q. Okay. And you indicated an hour and a half had lapsed during the period 
which he took the intoxilizer test and the time he was arrested. Is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Are you aware of the, the Widmark formula? 
A. What formula is that? 
Q. The formula that determines what the alcohol rate of consumption would 
have been at the time, certain periods of time? 
A. I'm, I'm aware of it. 
Q. My understanding is the metabolic is .15 per hour. Is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And if a n - And if you times that by 1->2, that would put it about 2.5. Is 
that correct? 
A. .15not~ 
Q. .15 per hour times that by 1-14 or 1-V£ hours that would be approximately 
2-1A Is that correct? 
THE JUDGE: 2-1A Mr. Skabelund. 
MR. SKABELUND: 2-1A 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
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MR. SKABELUND: Would that have put Mr. Preece under the legal limit or under a 
.08 if you deducted that out of the 1.10 minus the 2-%? 
MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, I think I'm going to object to this line of questioning based 
on relevance. The statutes are very clear that, that if the test is given within two hours 
there's, there's, it's pretty well conclusive of what the test was at the time of driving. 
THE JUDGE: It's a conclusive presumption under the statute. 
MR. SKABELUND: That's right. 
THE JUDGE: So I'll sustain the objection," (1Rec. 76-78). 
Based upon the testimony of Trooper Denny prior to the objection being made by 
the State and the responses that had been made by Trooper Denny thereto, Trooper 
Denny would/could have to conclude from his previous responses that if the metabolic 
rate is .15 per hour times 1-1/4, you would have approximately 2-/4 which would have 
rebutted the presumption and placing Defendant/Appellant below .08 breath alcohol. 
In Cityof Oremv. CrandalL 760 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1988), the Utah Court of 
Appeals stated: 
The statute [41-6-44(2)(a)(i)] does not suggest that if a person 
has a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or greater that he is 
presumed guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol. 
In the City of Orem v. Crandall supra, the Utah Court of Appeals pred a reading 
of 2§41 -6-44(1) alleging that it creates a conclusive presumption. A reading of the 
1AH references are of record; Rec. refers to record. 
2renumbered as §41-6-44(2) 
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statute shows that the language pertaining to .08 is merely conduct that is prohibited 
and raises no presumption, conclusive or otherwise. 
To the contrary, the statute provides for a violation of law in two (2) separate 
ways. The first is that the legislature has determined that it is a violation of law to drive 
a vehicle with blood alcohol content of .08 or greater. This is merely prohibitive 
conduct regardless of what that blood alcohol may have on the person actually 
operating the motor vehicle and his ability to operate it safely. In addition, the statute 
provides that regardless of the blood alcohol content of the driver of the vehicle, if the 
driver's ability to operate the vehicle safely is impaired because of alcohol ingestion, 
the conduct is a separate violation. The issue of whether or not the legislatures 
determination that the driving with blood alcohol level of .08 or greater is 
constitutionally sound is not before us. 
This court went on to state that the Oregon Court of Appeals considered the 
constitutionality of the statute similar to Utah's in State v. Clark, 35 Or. App. 851, 583 
P.2d 1142, 1145 (1978). Under the Oregon statute, an individual could be found guilty 
of driving while under the influence of intoxicants if he had a blood alcohol level of .10 
or greater, or if he is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or a dangerous drug, or 
a narcotic drug, i d , 583 P.2d at 1143. The defendant in Clark . . . claims that the 
privilege nor the statute prohibiting driving with a .10 blood alcohol level was 
unconstitutional because it created an impossible conclusive presumption. 
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The Oregon court rejected the argument and found that driving with a blood 
alcohol level of .10 or greater is an alternative statutory definition of the offense, not a 
conclusive presumption. The Oregon court noted that certain blood alcohol levels 
which "the legislature has seen fit to forbid . . . without more" k i In this regard, the 
Oregon court found that the evidence tending to establish the blood alcohol level and 
that the defendant's right to attack this evidence crucial to the determination that the 
statute did not create a conclusive presumption. 
Similarly, in Fuenning v. Superior Court 139 Ariz. 590, 680 P.2d 121, 127 
(1983), the Arizona Supreme Court found that Arizona statute would prohibit driving 
with a .10 or more blood alcohol level did not create an impermissible presumption 
because the defendant could attack the accuracy of the test on relevant ground, 
including inherent margin of error. Thus, the court reasoned, "conviction is impossible, 
and the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's blood alcohol level 
at the time of driving or controlling the vehicle was .10 or greater, not simply on the 
basis of the test results of .10 or greater." 
The Utah Court of Appeals then went on to state that the Utah Legislature, in 
keeping with other jurisdictions, has "see fit to provide this act. . . without more . . ." 
Although, the statutorily prescribed level in Utah is .08 rather than .10, we do not 
consider the difference in the level prescription relevant to the determination of the 
State's constitutionality on the issue of conclusive presumption. The Utah statute does 
not create a conclusive presumption because, like the statutes in question in Clark and 
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Fuenning, 1§41-6-44(1) allows the defendant to challenge the accuracy of the test on 
any relevant ground. See Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44.3 (1987). The Utah statute 
merely prohibits driving or controlling the vehicle with blood alcohol level of .08 or 
more, not driving or controlling a vehicle when a test shows a level of .08 or more. The 
Crandall court then made a ruling that 1§41-6-44(1) does not create a conclusive 
presumption. 
In 1987, an amendment to 1§41-6-44(1) added language stating that it was 
unlawful for a person to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle with a 
blood alcohol content of .08 or greater "as shown by a chemical test given within two 
hours after the alleged operation or physical control." 
In Richfield City v. Walker 790 P.2d 87 (Utah App. 1990), this court stated: 
The nature of the offense and the prohibited conduct are not 
changed by this amendment which only further describes the 
conditions that were wrought in a presumption of intoxication. 
It was error for the trial court to conclude that pursuant to §41-6-44(2) driving 
with a .08 blood alcohol creates a "conclusive presumption." The reading of 
§41-6-44(2), §41-6-44.3(3), and both the Crandall and Walker cases clearly 
establishes that the Utah State Legislature did not intend §41-6-44(2) to be a 
conclusive presumption but rather a rebuttable presumption. It was committed 
reversible error in concluding 1§41-6-44(1) creates a conclusive presumption. 
1
 renumbered as §41-6-44(2) 
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CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Trooper Denny lacked probable cause to stop Defendant/Appellant's vehicle and 
lacked the requisite reasonable and articulable suspicion that the Defendant/Appellant 
had committed a traffic violation. The court committed reversible error in concluding 
that §41-6-44(2)(i) Utah Code Annotated is a "conclusive presumption." Thereby, it 
was error for the court to sustain the State's objection when Defendant/Appellant was 
establishing that at the time of the arrest, Defendant/Appellant's breath alcohol was 
under the legal limit, or .08. Additionally, the State failed to establish that 
Defendant/Appellant moved left or right upon the highway and that such movement was 
not made with reasonable safety. 
Defendant/Appellant requests that the court reverse the Judgment and Sentence 
of the trial court and at least remand the case back to the District Court allowing 
Defendant/Appellant to put on the requisite evidence to establish whether 
Defendant/Appellant's breath alcohol was under .08 at the time of the arrest. 
DATED this //_ day of May, 1998. 
Iregg/y ^ kabelund 
Attorney for DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Tony Baird 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
I I West 100 North 
2nd Floor 
Logan, UT 84321 
DATED this / / day of May, 1998. 
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FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOYD L PREECE, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 
S ENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 975000499 MD 
Judge: BURTON H. HARRIS 
Date: September 16, 1997 
PRESENT 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GREGORY SKABELUND 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: July 9, 1942 
Audio 
Tape Number: 97-241 Tape Count: 96 
Clerk: angeladb 
CHARGES 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/08/1997 Not Guilty - Bench 
OPEN CONTAINER/DRINKING ALC IN VEH - Class C Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/08/1997 Guilty - Bench 
TURN/STOP/CHANGE LANES W/O SIGNAL - Class C Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/08/1997 Guilty - Bench 
HEARING 
TAPE 97-241 
COUNT 9 6 On record 
Defendant present w/counsel, Gregory Skabelund 
Defendant sentenced to 180 days jail, 178 days suspended; fine of 
$1200 to be paid at rate of $100 per month beginning October 1, 
1997; to enter and complete alcohol counseling and file certificate 
of completion with the court 
No alcohol clause; submit to search and seizure and random 
testing; to write monthly letters beginning November 1, 1997; to 
report to jail on September 24, 1997 at 5:00 p.m.; on count 2-fine 
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Case No: 975000499 
Date: Sep 16, 1997 
of $110 and 10 days jail time, suspended upon payment of fine; 
count 3-fine of $57 and 10 days jail time, suspended 
Off record 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALC/DRUGS a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 180 day(s) in the Cache County Jail. The total time 
suspended for this charge is 178 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of OPEN CONTAINER/DRINKING ALC 
IN VEH a Class C Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 10 day(s) in the Cache County Jail. The total time suspended 
for this charge is 10 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of TURN/STOP/CHANGE LANES W/O 
SIGNAL a Class C Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 10 day(s) in the Cache County Jail. The total time suspended 
for this charge is 10 day(s). 
Defendant is to report to the Cache County Jail. 
The Defendant is to report on September 24, 1997 at 5:00 pm. 
Defendant is to complete jail service by September 26, 1997. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
$1200.00 
$0.00 
$548.14 
$1200.00 
Charge # 2 Fine 
Suspended 
Due 
$110.00 
$0.00 
$110.00 
Charge # 3 Fine 
Suspended 
Due 
$57.00 
$57.00 
$0.00 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Amount Due 
$1367.00 
$57.00 
$548.14 
$1310.00 
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Case No: 975000499 
Date: Sep 16, 1997 
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY 
The following cases are on timepay 975000499. 
The defendant is to pay $100.00 monthly on the 1st. 
The number of payments scheduled is 12. 
The first payment is due on 10/01/1997 the final payment of $110.00 
is due on 10/01/1998. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 1 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by First District Court. 
Defendant to serve 2 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Cache County Jail. 
Defendant is to report on September 24, 1997. 
Defendant is to complete jail service by September 26, 1997. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of $1310.00 which includes the 
surcharge. 
Pay fine to FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Complete alcohol and/or drug counseling - pay all fees and file 
notice of completion with the Court. 
Consume or possess no alcohol/drugs - frequent no places alcohol 
served or consumed including bars, parties, liquor store. 
Submit to random search and seizure. 
Submit to testing upon request of law enforcement. 
Keep Court informed of current address while on probation. 
Defendant will report to Court in writing the first of each month. 
Dated this \"\ day of^.^r^totyW. I / 19 £ Q . 
Gregory Skabelund #5346 
Attorney at Law 
2176 North Main 
Logan, UT 84341 
(801)752-9437 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, NOTICE OF APPEAL 
v 
BOYD LEE PREECE, Case No. 975-499 
Defendant/Appellant. Judge Burton H. Harris 
Notice is hereby given that Defendant/Appellant, BOYD LEE PREECE, by and 
through counsel, Gregory Skabelund, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final 
judgment and sentence of the Honorable Burton H. Harris entered in this matter on 
September 16, 1997. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment and sentence. 
DATED this f - ^ day of October, 1997. 
J^J_ 
Gfegory^skabelund 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
NOTICE OF APPEAL in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Scott Wyatt 
Cache County Attorney 
I I West 100 North 
2nd Floor 
Logan, UT 84321 
DATED this _£7__day of October, 1997. 
y 
Gregory Skabelund #5346 
Attorney at Law 
2176 North Main 
Logan, UT 84341 
(801)752-9437 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF 
CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
AND TO AMEND NOTICE OF APPEAL 
BOYD LEE PREECE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 975-499 
Judge Burton H. Harris 
Defendant/Appellant, BOYD LEE PREECE, by and through counsel, Gregory 
Skabelund, and the State of Utah, by and through counsel, Bruce Ward, hereby 
stipulate to the entry of a Certificate of Probable Cause and to amend 
Defendant/Appellant's Notice of Appeal in the above-entitled matter. 
DATED this _^?Yday of October, 1997. 
^Gfegory Skabelund 
Attorney for Defendant 
"T 
DATED this 1A u day of October, 1997. 
Bruce^/ard^X L^ 7 y / 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND TO 
AMEND NOTICE OF APPEAL in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Bruce Ward 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
I I West 100 North 
2nd Floor 
Logan, UT 84321 
DATED this 'lA day of October, 1997. 
Gregory Skabelund #5346 
Attorney at Law 
2176 North Main 
Logan, UT 84341 
(801)752-9437 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
AMENDED 
Plaintiff/Appellee, NOTICE OF APPEAL 
v 
BOYD LEE PREECE, Case No. 975-499 
Defendant/Appellant. Judge Burton H. Harris 
Notice is hereby given that Defendant/Appellant, BOYD LEE PREECE, by and 
through counsel, Gregory Skabelund, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final 
judgment and sentence of the Honorable Burton H. Harris entered in this matter on 
September 16, 1997. The appeal is taken from the denial of motion to suppress, and 
the entire judgment and sentence. 
DATED this D y day of October, 1997. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Bruce Ward 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
I I West 100 North 
2nd Floor 
Logan, UT 84321 
DATED this ^Vday of October, 1997. 
FIRST DISTPICT COURT 
Gregory Skabelund#5346 CACHE r'i<w --
Attorney at Law 
2176 North Main '97 NOV-7 PI ^9 
Logan, UT 84341 
(801)752-9437 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ORDER ON PROBABLE CAUSE 
v 
BOYD LEE PREECE, Case No. 975-499 
Defendant. Judge Burton H. Harris 
The Court having reviewed Defendant's Application of Certificate of Probable 
Cause, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
That the Certificate of Probable Cause having been entered and Defendant's 
sentence of fine, imprisonment and/or probation and any suspension and related 
requirements of the Driver License Division are stayed pending and on appeal, and 
forthwith released from the Cache County Jail. 
DATED this \ C day of November, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
ORDER ON PROBABLE CAUSE in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Randon Draper 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
I I West 100 North 
2nd Floor 
Logan, UT 84321 
k DATED this v> day of November, 1997. 
